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INTRODUCTION 
The European Commission’s Capital 
Markets Union (CMU) has three objectives. 
The first objective is to improve access to 
finance for all businesses but especially 
SMEs; the second is to increase the share of 
capital markets in the funding mix of the 
real economy and the third  is to make 
capital markets more effective and integrate 
them more closely across borders.1 
The CMU initiative was launched on 18 
February 2015 with the issuance of a Green 
Paper entitled Building a Capital Markets 
Union.  The way in which the Commission 
is approaching the issue, by looking both to 
what the private sector can provide as well 
as what the public sector should do, and 
 
 
selecting a staged approach to the project, 
to gather momentum for it and not to have 
to wait to do something until everything has 
been done, is a positive sign.2 The 
European Parliament also adopted its first 
(and probably not the last) resolution on the 
CMU in July, giving a cautious welcome to 
the Commission’s thinking3. Both industry 
and civil society have shown remarkable 
interest in the subject with 422 responses to 
the Commission’s CMU Green Paper4. 
This article is based on a unique exercise 
aimed at bringing together the end-users of 
the CMU to design practical solutions to the 
CMU: on 19 March 2015, the Konrad 
Adenauer Foundation UK office and 
Standard Chartered Bank organised a CMU 
simulation game to develop and test CMU 
solutions that can be implemented by 20195. 
The game was hosted by KPMG and 
gathered private and public sector experts. 
There were 15 teams (trade associations, 
NGOs and academics) proposing specific 
policy solutions for the CMU. The 
proposals were evaluated by experts from 
the “end users” of the CMU (investors and 
companies). Alongside the evaluators, there 
was a high-level jury of politicians and 
officials. Finally, a small European 
Parliament and Council team tested the 
political feasibility of the proposals. Three 
policy areas were deemed by evaluators and 
jury members to make the biggest positive 
impact on Europe’s economy within the 
Capital Markets Union1 has three 
objectives. The first objective is to 
improve access to finance for all 
businesses but especially SMEs; the 
second is to increase the share of capital 
markets in the funding mix of the real 
economy; and the third is to make 
capital markets more effective and 
integrate them more closely across 
borders. This paper examines the best 
impact measures for the Capital 
Markets Union to proceed successfully. 
  
 




next four years. First, reviewing the 
structure of financial intermediation in 
Europe to ensure long-term equity funding 
for the economy; second, moving mid-sized 
firms and high-growth start-ups from bank 
lending to capital markets and facilitate 
access to equity funding; and third, 
balancing the need for transparency from 
investors with measures to allow for 
flexibility for investors. 
The EU needs to have more integrated, 
efficient, and effective financial markets. 
6The economic and political motivations 
for proposing a CMU are clearly visible. 
The name is more symbolic than real, as the 
substance falls short of achieving a fully 
unified capital market across the EU. 
Economically, CMU can help to bolster 
firms’ access to capital beyond the 
traditional bank-centred focus prevalent in 
Europe. Even more important is the 
political message: the CMU, however 
symbolic, is a commitment to the Single 
Market, and to keeping the UK on board. 
The City of London stands to benefit from 
a continent-spanning market, which would 
facilitate transactions and promises 
economies of scale. It is therefore no 
surprise that the CMU initiative was 
welcomed by British business groups and 
politicians, including Chancellor George 
Osborne. Seen from this perspective, 
fulfilling the original objective of the 
Treaties of Rome on the free movement of 
capital chimes with British proposals for a 
more competitive EU. Many see it as a 
clever move to help overcome the various 
confrontations between Europe and Britain 
on financial services, which are not just 
limited to political disagreement concerning 
financial regulation, but increasingly 
courtroom battles over financial laws. 7 
Finally, and maybe most importantly, the 
CMU is a step that signals a return to a 
more traditional EU activity of ‘market 
building’. In the long history of EU efforts 
to promote a single market for capital, the 
EU has always been strong at playing the 
role at which it is most effective: to facilitate 
exchange of capital flows across borders, by 
removing obstacles to cross-border 
investment. 
I. THE STRUCTURE OF 
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION 
IN EUROPE 
The funding model of a country’s economy 
is a result of its historic development that 
cannot be changed quickly. It has cultural 
components (e.g. equity culture, risk taking 
or levels of trust in society) and is mutually 
dependent on other policy areas, like 
pensions, social security or taxation.  
Europe’s bank dependent funding structure 
and European citizens’ preference of debt 
over equity products will not change for 
now. 
Savers in Europe prefer to invest in debt 
products, which they consider safer (due to 
the high deposit guarantee levels), while 
savers in the US prefer and are also forced 
to invest more in equity, private insurance 
and pension products. European 
households have much less assets to invest 
on average than US households. And the 
wider social security nets (state pension and 
sickness insurance) in Europe remove some 
of the pressure on individuals to invest in 
private insurance and pension products. 
European pension funds provide €4.3tn in 
investable assets and invest 37% of their 
portfolio in equities, vs €14.9tn and 53% 
respectively in the US. 
European countries are of course not 
uniform in their preferences and there are 
outliers to the average figures. The 
simulation game produced an important 
comparison of Swedish and German equity 
culture. About 80 % of Swedes invest 
directly in funds privately and 60 % of 
children in Sweden have savings in funds. 
This is much higher than even in the US, 
where 49% of families hold stocks. On the 
other hand, only 13% of Germans held 
shares or equity funds in 2014 and this has 
  
 




declined by one-third since 20018 due to 
perceived market failures.  
These decisions are embedded in social and 
political preferences on both sides of the 
Atlantic, which are not about to change. 
Discussing them mostly exceeds the remit 
of the CMU. Promoting equity culture can 
help to make some improvements, but it 
seems unreasonable to expect radical 
changes in behaviour. 
We must be aware of the direct impact these 
different saving preferences have on 
maturity transformation by financial 
intermediaries to turn savings into funding 
for corporates. Investments by US savers 
have a longer maturity than the bank 
deposits preferred by most EU savers – 
therefore it is easier for the financial system 
to provide for long-term investments in the 
US. 
The post-crisis prudential reforms limited 
both private equity (as equity investors or as 
debt financing) and long term investments 
by banks. At the same time, Solvency 2 is 
limiting the ability of institutional investors 
to invest in equity. All these tendencies 
work against the availability of long-term 
equity funding for the economy. 
II. MID-SIZED FIRMS AND 
HIGH-GROWTH START-UPS ARE 
THE “SWEET-SPOT” OF CMU  
For the CMU to have an impact on 
investments on the short term, it should 
focus on moving mid-sized firms from bank 
lending to capital markets (direct 
placements, securitisation) and helping more 
young, high-growth firms to access equity 
funding. Bank balance sheets are a much 
scarcer commodity today due to recent 
regulatory changes. Firms of all sizes are 
competing for access to these reduced 
balance sheets, but they are impacted in 
different ways.  
Large firms draw most of their funding 
from capital markets and are thus less bank-
reliant. They are struggling however with the 
reduced liquidity in bond markets as 
wholesale banks move out of market-
making. 
In its 2014 corporate cash survey, the 
Association of Corporate Treasurers 
showed that the financial crisis forced 
companies in general to increase their cash-
holdings9. They saw this cash pile as a buffer 
against the risk of reduced bank lending and 
political uncertainty. While 72% of 
treasurers are now expecting to run this pile 
down, almost 40% of them expect to hold 
more cash than they used to do. 
Smaller firms are totally bank dependent 
and will remain reliant on bank finance. 
Relieving the pressure on bank balance 
sheets from larger firms could allow bigger 
access for these smaller firms to limited 
funds. Although a jury member was 
sceptical whether capital freed in banks via 
securitisations would be used to create more 
lending to SMEs. 
Mid-sized firms are mostly bank 
dependent at the moment, but they are 
slowly turning towards market funding like 
direct placements or equity markets. Due to 
their larger sized loans, mid-sized firms 
could also profit from a more active 
securitisation market, provided that 
securitised loans are not retained and used 
for collateral at the ECB, but are placed on 
the market.  
How to reduce funding costs for mid-
sized listed companies? 
85% of all companies quoted on EU stock 
exchanges are small or mid-cap companies, 
but EU regulation is made assuming that all 
quoted companies have the same resources 
as the Eurostoxx50 e.g. one German 
DAX30 company employs 9 people to do 
its non-financial reporting alone; in smaller 
companies the Finance Director or 
Company Secretary often acts as the 
Investor Relations contact as well – there is 
no separate department.  
  
 




Reduce administrative costs of listing by 30-
50%10 
 Step I: Regulatory freeze on 
legislation affecting issuers until 2019  
 Step II: Perform cumulative impact 
assessment of financial regulation on issuers 
only  
 Step III: Based on the results of the 
impact assessment, and responses to the 
CMU Green Paper, draw up proposals to 
reduce regulatory & administrative burdens 
on quoted companies e.g. changes to 
Prospectus directive below  
 Step IV: Consider new better 
regulation provisions for smaller issuers– 
new SME Test for Issuers  
 
Revise the Prospectus Directive  
 Introduce the concept of an IPO 
and Secondary Public Offer  
 Create a Proportionate Prospectus 
for Secondary Public Offers on regulated 
markets 
 Ensure that the Proportionate 
Prospectus for Secondary Offers applies to 
all types of secondary public offer 
 Address the process of the national 
competent authority approving a prospectus 
 Increase the thresholds under which 
a prospectus does not have to be produced 
 Exempt offers carried out under the 
Takeover Regime from the prospectus 
regime 
 Create a specific prospectus regime 
for SME Growth Markets 
 
How to encourage institutional investors 
to invest in mid-sized companies: 
In order to facilitate much needed 
investment by Europe's institutional 
investors into small- and mid-sized 
companies, the European Commission 
encourage a pan-European debt private 
placement market ("PEPP"). This should 
include both a loan-based and a note-based 
PEPP. 
There are three national private placement 
markets in Europe that can have significant 
scale on the short term. The German loan-
based schuldshein market is a long-
established and well-developed market, 
having issued around €8 billion worth of 
loans in 201311. The French private 
placement market, which caters for both 
loan and note placements, remains primarily 
a domestic market but has experienced  
rapid growth from virtual non-existence a 
few years ago to facilitating €7 billion worth 
of issuance in 2013. The UK private 
placement market has historically been 
limited in scale. However, this may be set to 
change, in part due to a new wide 
exemption from withholding tax for interest 
on private placements. 
The EU should to encourage and facilitate 
growth and development of Europe's 
existing private placement markets initially. 
Over time, with the assistance of more 
standardised documentation where possible 
there is scope for building wider and deeper 
debt PEPP.  
Loan-Based (Debt) PEPP 
The EU would benefit from more 
consistent legal documentation for loan 
transactions for SMEs in particular.  In 
particular a common approach to 
assignment and transfer would assist and 
help to achieve a smooth secondary market.  
There are limits to the capacity of different 
jurisdictions to run such markets.  It is likely 
that the larger EU member states are better 
placed to create them - but, in such 
  
 




circumstances, the markets should be open 
to corporates/borrowers from all over the 
EU and such corporates are likely to 
gravitate towards those markets which best 
serve their own needs both financially and 
geographically. 
Note-Based PEPP  
Cost is the main impediment to SMEs 
issuing notes through a private placement. 
Increased legal costs, various agent fees and 
the potential requirement of a prospectus 
can significantly increase the cost of a 
issuing notes rather than granting loans. 
Therefore, in order to increase the number 
of SME note issues in Europe, reducing the 
borrower-side costs is a priority. 
Unlike the loan market, the note market is 
regulated at EU-level by the Prospectus 
Directive and MiFID. In many cases, a note 
issue on the private placement markets will 
fall within an exemption from the need to 
produce a prospectus. However, due to the 
high costs associated with producing a 
prospectus, the Prospectus Directive 
exemptions should be immediately widened 
to ensure that they are invariably available to 
SMEs seeking to issue in the private 
placement market. The "qualifying investor" 
base should be widened to ensure that most 
expected PEPP market investors are 
included and the "minimum note 
denomination" threshold should be lowered.  
How to boost funding to job creating 
start-ups? 
High-growth, high-risk start-ups are a 
unique sub-group of smaller firms. These 
young firms are often too risky for bank 
lending. UK data show that in the early 
stage there is a very high risk of business 
failure with only 52% of new businesses 
surviving for 3 years and 28% surviving 7 
years. Instead of bank lending, these start-
ups normally draw financing from venture 
capital and in times of abundant funding 
they tend to “hoard cash”, waiting for 
investment opportunities. Compared to the 
US, these start-ups are often facing difficulty 
to access equity capital in the EU12. The 
sources of equity funding for SMEs are 
underdeveloped in Europe compared to the 
US: US PE and VC funds had €488bn to 
invest in 2013, compared to €245bn in 
Europe13.  
Proposals to channel venture capital 
investment to high-growth start-ups: 
 Develop a pan-European angel 
investor marketplace for these start-ups - 
what you might call pre Capital Markets 
Union. “High growth businesses in 
particular struggle to access cross border 
funding, and often go to US for 
investment.  Part of the solution must be to 
remove barriers to cross border business 
angel activity such as contradictory rules in 
fiscal incentives which prohibit a single 
market in Business Angel finance.”  
 Facilitate VC investing through a 
centrally managed initiative similar to the US 
Small Business Investment Company that 
provides financing in the critical $250,000 - 
$5m range in the form of subordinated 
loans or equity investment.  
 Crowdfunding helps start-ups to 
overcome the demand of capital for early-
stage (equity) financing. Existing divergent 
national regimes resulted in a fragmented 
European market. Harmonisation to 
overcome this could follow either of two 
options: A limited harmonisation option 
would involve investor self-certification, a 
cap for investors/offerings, and investment 
information on a pan-European basis. Full 
harmonisation would introduce a European 
passport for (equity) crowdfunding 
platforms. This would only require 
crowdfunding platforms to obtain one 
single authorisation/registration from any 
competent authority within the EEA to be 
able to offer their services on a cross-border 











III. INVESTOR’S DILEMMA 
The discussion highlighted a potential 
conflict between the fiduciary duty of asset 
managers and possible “political” 
requirements regarding their investments. 
There was clear agreement that investors 
should consider the interests of wider 
society not only those of their beneficiaries. 
The question was whether a conflict 
between these two objectives may arise and 
in this case which one should prevail? In 
practice, this has raised several sub-
questions: Should investors managing the 
savings of EU citizens invest in EU assets, 
especially in equities? (As one of the 
participants pointed out, European pension 
funds invest 37% of their portfolio in 
equities vs 53% in the US.) Should they 
follow a socially responsible investment 
strategy against absolute returns? And most 
importantly should they be mandated by law 
to follow pre-defined investments strategies 
or should this be achieved on a ‘comply or 
explain’ basis with adequate transparency.  
Participants mostly agreed about the need 
for transparency from investors. But there 
were disagreement about the administrative 
burden of too much transparency and about 
mandating inflexible investment strategies, 
without consideration to changing market 
environment and the wide variety investors 
on the market. Some participants warned 
policymakers to be conscious of the outsize 
financial risks this may create in the future.  
Practical policy answers to these questions 
should  
 strike the right balance between 
obligation versus “comply or explain” (asset 
managers and evaluators thought the 
comply or explain approach worked well); 
 define the right level of transparency 
and disclosure on investment decisions that 
doesn’t place unnecessary burden on small 
and mid-sized companies (most participants 
thought that reporting burden of smaller 
companies should be further reduced 
instead of increasing it); 
 global ESG standards (like UNPRI 
or Equator Principles) already exist for 
sustainable investment – the EU should 
embrace these standards rather than seeking 
to create new ones; 
 define the level of control for 
beneficiaries over investment decisions 
(which should be linked to issues of 
financial literacy).  
Should asset managers be mandated to 
pursue an ESG compliant investment 
strategy over absolute returns? 
One of the participants argued that capital 
market participants and investment products 
should be mandated by law to consider 
environmental, social and corporate 
governance (ESG) factors: it was 
“disappointing that ESG has been included 
in the CMU Green Paper as an afterthought: 
the only mention is as an emerging 
investment category”.  
Reactions to this were mostly negative. As 
one of the evaluators pointed out: “A 
pension fund’s duty is to meet the needs of 
its pensioners by choosing assets from 
around the world. It is not an arm of the 
state, it has a fiduciary duty to its 
beneficiaries.” Another evaluator has argued 
that this would result in lower returns for 
beneficiaries: “We can choose a return of x by 
investing on the basis of economic criteria only or we 
can opt for a return of 0.x if we invest in a socially 
responsible manner.”  
Answer from an investor emphasized that 
“a company exploiting its employees, its local 
community, is not a good investment as it would 
hurt its cash flow on the long term”.  However 
this investor thought that “comply and 
explain” is sufficient for ESG objectives and 
investors should not be mandated by law to 
follow these objectives in their investment 
decisions.  
Is more transparency the solution? 
A participant quoted the Kay Review14 
stating the decline in ‘relationships of trust 
  
 




and confidence’ in favour of a highly 
intermediated investment chain with 
misaligned incentives at every step.  
Institutional investors with long-term 
liabilities judge performance and award 
mandates over short-term horizons.  One of 
the evaluators agreed that markets were 
indeed inefficient, “they favoured short termism 
over long termism by nature” and they did not 
properly recognise or reward companies 
who make long-term plans and investment, 
including on sustainability.  This was 
contradicted by one of the investors, 
arguing that “a company exploiting its employees, 
its local community, is not a good investment as it 
would hurt its cash flow on the long term”. 
Participants mostly agreed that transparency 
and accountability were good for a 
sustainable investment ecosystem: “Investors 
need to know that they are under scrutiny. More 
accountable and transparent investors make better 
investment decisions.” They can help change 
short-termist culture and reward good 
behaviours. A participant argued that this 
should include requiring investors to publish 
voting records and rationales, meaningful, 
substantive RI and engagement policies and 
outcomes that they know will be scrutinised 
by beneficiaries, civil society and the media 
will encourage more responsible behaviour.   
Do we need more rights for individual 
investors and do they have adequate 
financial literacy to exercise these 
rights? 
It was proposed that the IORPs Directive, 
currently being reviewed, could give savers 
rights to be consulted about a scheme’s 
investment policies; to access annual reports 
explaining how their pension fund or 
insurance company has implemented these 
policies and is managing long-term risk; to 
elect representatives to governing 
committees; and to receive responses to 
reasonable requests for information. The 
aim is not to bombard all savers with lots of 
information which many would not use but 
make the information available to those who 
do want it and to civil society.    
An asset manager thought that lack of trust 
in the financial system and lack of financial 
literacy made it difficult to hold reasonable 
conversations in public. There was also 
concern whether smaller listed companies 
should be subjected to detailed ESG 
reporting requirements. As one evaluator 
argued: “it takes a lot of time for companies to do 
it. It’s easy for big companies, but for small 
companies it’s very demanding. Also, it’s less useful 
as small companies are often deeply linked into the 
local economy and even retail investors can get to 
know them much more easily.”   
Skewed regulatory incentives? 
Similarly to the new capital requirements 
discouraging banks from long term 
infrastructure and equity investments, 
Solvency 2 impedes investment by insurers 
into equity markets. Regulators must be 
aware of the impact of their policy choices, 
therefore more efforts would be required to 
produce a cumulative impact assessment of 
prudential rules on investment, growth and 
job creation.  
In the light of low interest rates and anaemic 
growth in Europe, regulators should review 
Solvency 2 to allow for more flexibility to 
investors. 
IV. A CMU THAT REMAINS 
OPEN TO THE WORLD 
The European Commission regularly cites 
that 90% of economic growth is now 
coming from outside of Europe15. As the 
EU’s current trade strategy argues “we need 
to seize the opportunity of higher levels of 
growth abroad, especially in East and South 
Asia.16” But the ability of European 
companies and consumers to take advantage 
of this growth may be limited by the current 
regime for assessing equivalence. Therefore 
the Commission should set out proposals 
for a new equivalence regime in its 
forthcoming CMU action plan. One of the 
objectives of the CMU should be the 
development and putting into practice of a 
new regime for assessing equivalence with 
  
 




partner countries.  This needs to be both 
pragmatic and predictable, providing a 
coherent approach in the equivalence 
determination.  The regime needs to take 
account of the different regulatory 
environments and approaches in partner 
countries, eschewing a one-size-fits-all 
approach, and instead providing for 
flexibility on the basis of agreed principles.  
Elements of this new regime should include: 
 A principles-based assessment, not a 
line by line tick-box exercise.  Equivalence 
needs to be assessed from the perspective of 
the objectives the regulatory regime being 
assessed is designed to achieve and the 
success with which it does so.  A line by line 
assessment is not only inappropriate, but 
also risks missing whether or not the 
regulation in question delivers the outcomes 
it is intended to.  Where possible, and to 
make this easier and coherent, equivalence 
should be assessed from the standpoint of 
internationally agreed standards, which all 
parties should be working to adhere to. 
 EU regulation orientated to 
international standards, both in Level 1 and 
in interpretation at Level 2.  In order to take 
the lead in reversing the trend towards 
disaggregation of capital markets, the EU 
should make clear that it will orientate its 
own standards to international ones where 
they exist, both at level 1 and when setting 
out how the rules will be interpreted at level 
2. 
 The criteria for how equivalence will 
be assessed should be clearly defined at level 
1, thus enabling international partners to 
more effectively plan ahead, and so avoid 
gaps in access to markets.  Similarly, there 
should be clear guidance at level 1 on how 
regulation should be interpreted at level 2 to 
make future regimes predictable and enable 
partners to plan ahead. 
 There should be formalised 
regulatory dialogue, as legislation is being 
devised, progressed and finalised, so that 
partner countries can better understand EU 
rules, and contribute any ideas that may 
avoid measures that may inadvertently 
undermine the flow of capital in and out of 
the EU.  These regulatory dialogues should 
replicated by the ESAs at level 2, too, to 
ensure coherent supervision. 
 Clear timelines should be given to 
the equivalence assessment process, and a 
process of prioritisation needs to be defined.  
This should be based on the dual principle 
of (i) working with jurisdictions that are 
already very close to the EU’s regimes (the 
low hanging fruit,) and (ii) those with the 
most significant trading relationships (the 
ones likeliest to yield the most benefit to EU 
citizens and businesses.) 
 As part of its mission to promote 
growth and jobs, the EU authorities should 
proactively identify who these jurisdictions 
are and engage with them, rather than 
waiting for them to contact the 
Commission.  It is in Europe’s consumers 
and businesses’ interests for these 
equivalence assessment s to be completed, 
and the EU authorities have it within their 
competence to initiate the assessment.   
 The equivalence assessment has to 
be non-discriminatory, and, where partners 
are equivalent, non-discretionary.  The 
Commission should comply with ESMA 
determinations of equivalence, and do so 
promptly. 
Finally, the new equivalence regime should 
ensure the principle of no repeat 
judgements.  For example, if another 
country’s competent authority is deemed to 
be independent for the purposes of the 
equivalence assessment for one piece of EU 
legislation, it should be deemed to be so for 
them all – notwithstanding any subsequent 
changes in its status, of course. 
V. THE PROBLEM WITH 
MARKET MAKING 
While there is no single measurement for 
liquidity, there is general agreement that this 
has been reduced since the financial crisis. 
The Committee on the Global Financial 
System brought together 29 senior officials 
from 22 central banks to assess changes in 
  
 




market liquidity. It’s report17 shows that 
market liquidity is currently at a premium, 
and volatility shocks and market dislocations 
may become more common.  
A participant argued that public debt and 
equity markets benefit fully from the 
essential role played by intermediaries in 
bringing issuers and investors, users and 
providers of capital together, facilitating risk 
management, and ensuring continuity of 
supply and demand by use of their own 
resources (i.e. balance sheet) to make 
markets. 
Recent regulation has both significantly 
reduced the incentive for existing liquidity 
providers to ‘make markets’ and increased 
barriers to entry for any alternative players. 
How to improve market liquidity? 
As a first step a cumulative impact 
assessment should consider the barriers to 
the provision of liquidity through market 
making: 
 Market transparency in MiFID 2: 
Reduction in market-making in less liquid 
instruments if firm quotes need to be made 
available to multiple parties (pre-trade) and 
large transactions require immediate 
disclosure (post trade). The calibration of 
what stocks are liquid or illiquid for the 
purposes of the transparency requirements 
must strike a careful balance to achieve 
transparency without putting at risk the 
capacity or willingness of intermediaries 
execution in size in thinly-traded stocks 
 CSDR seeks to improve market 
discipline and certainty of settlement and 
risk mitigation in EU markets by punishing 
failed settlement and imposing buy-in 
against actors who fail to deliver. However, 
it is equally important that CSDR regime 
takes adequate account of the market 
characteristics of SME and illiquid securities 
to avoid adversely impacting the liquidity 
profiles of these securities to the detriment 
of all market participants. This could 
adversely impacts illiquid securities and 
exposes market makers to considerable fines 
 Central clearing rules in EMIR: Shift 
in market-making activity from non- to 
centrally-cleared derivatives as well as from 
OTC to exchange traded derivatives, 
reinforcing liquidity bifurcation. Decline in 
inventories given higher cost of hedging. 
Reduced market-making in derivatives in 
particular for non-centrally cleared 
instruments 
 Decline in inventory as hedging 
costs rise due to the Short Selling 
Regulation:  The decision to define exempt 
market making activities by reference only 
to activities on a trading venue, means 
market makers cannot use the exemption in 
relation to trading OTC derivative 
transactions.  This is particularly significant 
for some sovereign debt and most sovereign 
CDS instruments where dealing occurs away 
from trading venue because these venues 
lack the capacity to cope with trading large 
bespoke and generally very illiquid 
instruments.  
A proposed Financial Transaction Tax: the 
cascading effect of taxation risks depressing 
trading volumes in low-margin market-
making transactions making them 
completely illiquid. 
VI. SUPPORTING LONG-TERM 
INVESTMENT 
One of the participants suggested to 
mandate prudential regulators to promote 
long-term investment and funding for SMEs 
as an objective on equal footing with 
financial stability.  
Banks, insurers and pension funds are the 
biggest sources of funding, but bank and 
insurance capital rules discourage long-term, 
infrastructure, equity and SME financing. 
Banks in particular have more data than 
anyone else – they will still need sound 
underwriting practices, but if the prudential 
rules effectively ration banks’ lending, they 
may cherry-pick the best creating an adverse 
  
 




selection problem for other potential 
providers of finance. 
There are valid reasons for designing 
prudential rules in this way, including the 
lessons from the financial crisis. Prudential 
regulators may not wish to have an objective 
to promote the flow of funding as they may 
feel unable to properly balance this against 
safety and soundness objectives. However, 
without addressing this, the CMU may only 
have limited success if prudential regulation 
will continue to create new barriers. 
Another participant proposed a pan-EU 
real-time database of infrastructure projects 
built on 28 Member State infrastructure 
databases. This would increase the visibility 
of infrastructure demand through an 
infrastructure pipeline. The European 
Commission’s proposal to establish a 
European Investment Project Pipeline is 
welcome and the database currently 
maintained by the EIB of projects which 
have been submitted to it for financing goes 
some way to address this need, but is not 
sufficiently visible or comprehensive. A fully 
pan-EU infrastructure database which 
standardises key metrics such as funding 
requirements, contractual structures and 
environmental requirements would enable 
greater investment by the private sector. 
Projects included on the central database 
could be submitted by individual companies 
as well be drawn from the 28 Member State 
databases. 
VII. SMES ARE CRUCIAL FOR 
THE SUCCESS OF THE CMU – BUT 
NOT SUCH A LOW HANGING 
FRUIT AS MANY HAVE THOUGHT 
There was wide agreement among 
participants that SMEs rely overwhelmingly 
on banks for finance. And, surprisingly to 
some, there is more money available to 
European than to US SMEs: €2.0tn vs 
€1.2tn in outstanding stock, but the majority 
of EU financing is bank lending (€1.4tn vs 
€0.5tn)”18.  Micro and small firms are too 
small for bond markets, thus they are 
dependent on bank lending. Bank lending to 
SMEs often involves comparatively small 
amounts that no other market participant 
would be willing to provide (except for 
crowd-funding platforms). Average SME 
lending in the UK is around £10,000, which 
is very small even for retail banks. 
Small, high-risk start-ups may use non-bank 
funding (mostly equity finance from venture 
capital), but they only represent 1% of the 
total SME population. (See discussion on 
the CMU “sweet-spots”) 
This is unlikely to change any time soon. 
Some participants have called for more 
standardised capital market solutions for 
SMEs, but nobody could present a specific 
operational idea on how small firms could 
draw funding from capital markets. The 
CMU could make a difference by  
 moving mid-sized businesses (the 
upper band of the SME category, depending 
on definition) to the bond and equity 
markets, thus allowing more access for small 
firms (the vast majority of SMEs) to bank 
balance sheets; 
 encouraging more venture capital 
funding for young, high-risk firms that 
create an outsize proportion of new jobs 
(firms less than 3 years old only account for 
17% of total employment but create 43% of 
new jobs); 
 resolving informational frictions in 
SME markets by EU wide credit registers 
and harmonised accounting standards (more 
difficult to achieve than most participants 
expected); 
 improving access to finance for the 
smallest SMEs by encouraging more cross-
border lending and cross-country 
integration in the SME lending market; 
 providing more information sources 
on funding options to SMEs , increasing 









Some often cited solutions that are 
unlikely to work 
One of the most surprising conclusions 
concerned SME credit information: central 
credit registries and accounting 
harmonisation. 
Most people who intervened stated that 
harmonising SME accounting standards 
would be an almost impossible task by 2019 
(see below in VIII/5). And without such 
harmonised reporting standards, a simple 
cross-border comparison of financial 
information remains difficult.  
Jury members voiced scepticism on the 
usefulness of Central Bank based credit 
registers in general and the often cited 
Banque de France register in specific as a 
tool for supporting investment decisions to 
SMEs (see below in VIII/4). It was 
emphasized that Central Bank credit 
registers have developed primarily as 
prudential supervision and monetary 
decision making support tools19 and not as 
sources for investor information. These 
registers distribute data on existing loans 
and even if all legal barriers could be solved, 
would not serve as an adequate tool for 
deciding on finance to new clients. The 
work undertaken at the ECB in establishing 
a Euro area credit register (AnaCredit) is 
also aimed at collecting information on 
credit exposures and credit risks to support 
the macro and micro-supervisory tasks20.  
Another jury member expressed his fears 
that SME loan securitization can become 
the next sub-prime crisis. While 
securitisation should be encouraged, in an 
economic downturn securitised SME loans 
will be the first to default.   
What could work: voluntary credit 
registers and SME benchmarks 
Under the existing data protection rules, the 
only way forward for credit registries 
seemed to be a voluntary credit register for 
larger SMEs considering external market 
based finance. A participant also remarked 
that whether comparable credit information 
(even if achieved against the odds) will not 
in itself change investors’ risk appetite and 
will not lead to greater funding of SMEs. 
One of the evaluators remarked that 
investors “are looking every week into 
moving into smaller investments but have 
no benchmarks for pricing or guidance on 
the sector. An SME benchmark would help 
not only flow of finance but getting pricing 
right.” 
VIII. IMPROVING THE FLOW OF 
FINANCE TO “TRADITIONAL” 
SMES 
Participants made several proposals on 
improving the flow of finance to the bulk of 
SMEs. In order to correctly introduce the 
variety of ideas, we decided to allocate a 
separate chapter to these.  
1. Relieving pressure on bank 
balance sheets 
The approach welcomed by evaluators was 
to focus on relieving the pressure on bank 
balance sheets from larger firms and thus 
allow banks to lend more to smaller firms. 
However there is no guarantee that the 
freed up capital will be lent to smaller firms, 
unless there is a business case for banks to 
do so – which takes us back to reducing 
capital requirements for SME lending 
without endangering financial stability: 
Participants agreed that improving 
securitisation markets, including the 
securitisation of SME loans, will help. 
Though it’s linked to this, there was no 
discussion on the usefulness of Central 
Bank provision of cheap funding to banks 
for lending to SMEs (the Bank of England’s 
Funding for Lending scheme21 or the ECB’s 
TLTRO). The currently existing 
securitisation markets in Spain and Itely are 
characterised by high-retention rates (for use 
as collateral with the ECB) and low rates of 








2. Standardization of loan terms 
Another idea presented, but not widely 
discussed, was to drive a greater 
standardization of SME loan terms. This 
would allow SMEs to compare lending 
conditions across different banks. It remains 
unclear if this would be feasible at domestic 
level and more research may be required 
whether such initiatives already exist in 
individual Member States. Comparable loan 
terms cross-border seem unfeasible 
considering the tiny cross-border lending 
and the remaining huge differences in retail 
markets in the EU. 
3. The real lesson from the US 
about “interstate lending” 
Participants suggested that “EU Regulation 
should focus on lowering entry barriers for 
new lenders, including non-banks, into local 
and national markets, thus encouraging 
diversity and competition. This should also 
make local economies more resilient against 
local or national bank failures. For CMU to 
work it will therefore be paramount to encourage 
genuine cross-country integration in the retail/SME 
banking sector by reducing the de facto barriers 
to foreign entry and by encouraging cross-
border consolidation of banks.” There are 
interesting lessons here from state-level 
banking deregulation in the US and from 
banking sector liberalisation of the post-
socialist EU Member States.  A cross-border 
retail banking market can reduce the price 
and increase availability of credit for 
non‐financial firms. 
4. A pan-EU SME credit register – 
sounds good but difficult to realize 
In many European countries credit data are 
shared through a central credit register 
(CCR), owned and operated by central 
banks or financial supervisors. Participants 
suggested an EU-wide CCR and 
harmonized credit-scoring standards.  
Some jury members highlighted that 
achieving harmonised credit registries would 
be challenging due to differing bankruptcy, 
tax and accounting laws in EU member 
states. Also, existing market practices are 
very different across the EU: some 
countries, like the UK, use private credit 
referencing agencies, while others use bank 
databases. Partial sharing of these data 
among banks is possible in some countries 
(as “black lists”), but there are very strict 
data protection requirements.  
Considering all these barriers, participants 
thought that a voluntary credit register for 
those larger SMEs who want to access 
funding could be a quickest way forward.   
5. Harmonising accounting rules 
“Financial information is the lifeblood of 
capital markets” has been repeated into a 
cliché – still we are far from having 
comparable financial information across EU 
Member States. This is partly due to historic 
differences in GAAPs and in differing tax 
systems driving different accounting needs. 
Against this background, harmonising 
accounting rules for SMEs would be seen as 
going counter to simplifying administrative 
burden. It would require small firms to learn 
and apply new rules that are different to the 
existing GAAP. In some cases it may go 
counter to earlier EU rules to significantly 
ease reporting requirements for micro-
firms22. 
What could be done? In the CMU 
consultation, question 8 asks about 
developing a common EU level accounting 
standard for small and medium-sized 
companies listed on MTFs. To do this, the 
logical approach would be to allow for the 
voluntary use of IFRS for SMEs. However 
this seems to go counter to recent regulatory 
decisions: the estimate of EFRAG about the 
non-compatibility of IFRS with EU law, the 
recent introduction in the UK and Sweden 
of a significantly amended IFRS for SMEs 
version. These discrepancies would all need 
to be reconciled. Member States could show 
they were serious about finding a solution 
by agreeing on the long pending common 
  
 




corporate tax base. This would remove an 
important barrier from accounting 
harmonisation. 
6. Increasing the availability of 
information on financing options 
Participants were sceptical about EU 
harmonisation in the area of financial 
education and information. Rather they 
thought that the European Commission 
could add value by signposting investors to 
information sources and helping to spread 
best practices.  The specific ways suggested 
to increase the availability of information on 
funding sources for SMEs: 
 Establish a more coordinated 
availability and consistency of borrowing 
and investing information for SMEs on a 
pan-European basis.  
 The European Commission should 
support a European Finance Guide – similar 
to the UK Business Finance Guide – to be 
co-ordinated by leading pan-European 
professional and industry bodies 
 Help small firms understand the 
range of specialist finance options available 
to them. Debt finance may not always be 
the right option for a small firm. 
Entrepreneurs need to better understand the 
balance between debt versus equity finance 
and to improve their firms’ investment 
readiness.  
   Consistent industry-based 
definitions for SMEs (European 
Commission, Prospectus Directive, MiFID 
definitions compared to industry-specific 
definitions from the SBA) 
 Produce easy-to-understand ‘how to’ 
guides for SMEs 
 Create a ‘one-stop shop for SMEs 
like the US Small Business Administration 
by merging existing initiatives and providing 
access to required information in a user-
friendly way 
 Facilitate primary listings, secondary 
market and stockbroker research for SMEs 
CONCLUSIONS 
The main impact of the CMU initiative so 
far has been more political than economic. 
The CMU, however symbolic, is a 
commitment to the Single Market, and to 
keeping the UK in the EU. It signals a 
return to a more traditional EU activity of 
‘market building’ by creating the necessary 
legal principles and political trust that enable 
industry to invest and thrive.  If the CMU 
contributes to a more positive political 
outlook that encourages companies to invest 
in Europe, it has already achieved a lot. 
Lord Hill is cautious to emphasize he 
champions a ‘bottom-up’ approach for the 
CMU with market-driven solutions wherever 
possible. Still, most of the measures the 
Green Paper proposes or seeks views on are 
not bottom-up activities, but rather classical 
top- down EU legislation, seeking to 
harmonise pan-European capital market 
rules. At the same time, the Green Paper 
was largely silent on the infrastructure and 
the enforcement needed to erect a genuine 
CMU. If this remains the case in the Action 
Plan to be published in September, this 
would reinforce the priority for market-
driven solutions.  
There is a theoretical debate whether the 
EU would need to “rebalance its excessive 
dependence on bank financing” and rely 
more on market finance. This debate will 
remain at a mostly theoretical level as the 
majority of EU markets have a historic 
preference for bank finance, which is not 
about to change. In some countries (e.g. 
German, Hungary) the recent experience of 
retail investors and regulatory changes point 
to an increasing willingness of retail 
investors to keep their money in bank 
deposits perceived as safer than investing in 
fund products. 
On the level of specific initiatives, the CMU 
will aim at low-hanging fruit instead of 
politically sensitive reforms to underlying 
structures like insolvency regimes, taxation 
or accounting. In line with this, boosting 
securitization and allowing for easier listing 
are expected to be the first major initiatives. 
  
 




Each is seen as a welcome, though not 
revolutionary change. The major impact to 
investment may come from measures on 
medium-sized and high-growth firms. 
SMEs, while politically important, offer less 
obvious solutions and very few low hanging 
fruit. 
Gergely Polner is Head of EU Public 
Affairs, Standard Chartered Bank. 
Professor John Ryan is Visiting Fellow at 
LSE Ideas and Research Associate at 
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